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Abstract 
This paper puts the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 into its historical and 
economic context. It points out that the developments which led to the demise 
of communism were not restricted to the Soviet Bloc but part of a longer-term 
crisis of the global economy. Using Kondtratieff’s theory of Long Waves in 
capitalist developments, this paper shows how the end of the long post-war 
boom in around 1974 represented the top of the Kondtratieff wave and that 
the primary recession of 1979-82 and the deflationary policies carried out in 
order to restore capitalist profitability at that point also laid the ground for the 
undermining of the Soviet Bloc economies. 1989 is therefore seen as the 
consequence of the shift to global financialisation of the economy which 
necessitated a competitive catch-up policy in the form of Perestroika, the 
corollary of which was a readiness on the part of the Soviet Union to let 
Eastern Europe go its own way.  The period since 1989 in Germany is 
presented as one in which the major party of the Centre-Left, the SPD, was 
forced to tack to the neo-liberal wind but which left the space for the 
PDS/Linke to profile itself as a left alternative. The current crisis, which the 
author contends will issue into a long Kondtratieff depression lasting until 
around 2020, means that social and economic priorities will shift away from 
the market and back towards the re-establishment of the primacy of politics 
over the market. This will put Die Linke in a strong position to represent the 
disadvantaged and force the SPD back towards a more leftist position. The 
end result, the author contends, will be a realignment of the Left into a solid 
block on the basis of the changed demography of a reunited Germany and a 
global economic crisis. 
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The German Left and the Second Great Crash 
1989-2009: 20 years of marking time 
 
Dr Peter Thompson 
 
Since this paper was first conceived a year ago the world has changed in a way which 
makes the upheavals of 1989 and the post-mural period seem like a distant memory 
but which also puts them into an explanatory context which I would like to explore 
here. It is difficult to grasp just how significant the current turmoil is and will 
continue to be, but in my view it represents capitalism’s 1989, its Große Wende, or 
Second Great Crash in which not only its reputation for economic competence but 
also its ideological high-ground will be increasingly challenged by parties of the Left 
and Right. Many comparisons are being made with this financial crisis and the Wall 
Street Crash of 1929 but the comparisons are usually superficial and non-explanatory. 
The fact that we are now in the midst of the Second Great Crash makes it difficult to 
say precisely what is going to happen, but I would argue that there are certain patterns 
of development which enable us to make some guarded predictions for both the world 
economy and the fate of the German Left and to look for the historical links between 
the two, including its performance and position since the fall of the wall. I would like 
to take the risk of maintaining here that we are now entering a long down-turn in 
economic fortunes which will last for at least another 10-15 years and which will 
change completely the political fortunes of the Left. In that context I hope I will be 
forgiven for straying rather from the remit of talking purely about the German Left 
since 1989 but for analysing the links between the collapse of Communism in 1989 
and the Second Great Crash of 2008.  
 
Of course history never repeats itself precisely (not even as farce) and the pre-existing 
political conditions are very different now to the situation in 1929, but the central 
point of this essay will be the contention that the whole of the post-mural period from 
1989 was leading up to this Second Great Crash, precisely because die Wende itself 
was caused by its Vorscheine or pre-echoes. Indeed, I shall argue here that the 
collapse of Communism was itself merely an epiphenomenon of the Crash which we 
are now seeing coming to full fruition.1 This means that our consideration of the 1989 
Wende has to be one which takes into account much longer-term and wider-scale 
developments in the world economy in both East andWest. I will argue that both the 
fall of the wall and the current crisis go back to 1974, a date which marked the great 
Tendenzwende: the shift to the Washington Consensus of speculation over production, 
the end of Bretton Woods and the undermining of regulated financial markets in 
favour of what Peter Gowan has called ‘the Global Gamble’.2
 
One of the first points to note is that people do actually learn from experience and it is 
clear that the liquidationist tendencies of the free marketers of the 1930s are being 
reined in slightly by the reflationists of the 21st century, but the battle is not yet won. 
However, even the reflationist trend as contained in the Paulson Plan for a $700bn 
bail-out of the financial sector will only be able to ameliorate some of the worst 
effects of what is going to be probably the greatest deflationary shakeout in the 
history of capitalism and therefore also one of the socially most disruptive. $700bn, 
                                                 
1 I already argued this in 2000 in my PhD thesis, published as The Crisis of the German Left London 
and New York: Berghahn, 2005 
2 Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble London: Verso, 1999 
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while a lot of money, is, after all, only a drop in the ocean of total overall 
indebtedness of some $53 trillion in the US alone. By the Wednesday morning, 8th 
October, at the point of writing this, it is clear that stock markets around the world 
have realised that neither this move, nor the more than £50bn promised by the British 
government, is enough to overcome the structural problems of the global economy 
and represents just another temporary sticking plaster approach. But the comparisons 
made with 1929 are important and instructive to us here not simply in their own right 
but also because of what they tell us about certain patterns of boom and slump in the 
world economy and their socio-historical fall-out. This essay will seek to put this 
Crash into the framework of Long Wave theory, applying it to both economic and 
political contexts. This is because, as with all historical developments, it is necessary - 
without taking an excessively reductionist line - to trace its proper socio-economic 
context.  
 
1989 did not arrive out of nowhere (although many who should know better seem to 
think it did) but was the product of a long-term economic trend which linked the 
Soviet Bloc into the world economy in a way which made change unavoidable. In 
order to explain this context I would like to consult a rather neglected and old-
fashioned economic theorist: namely, Nikolai Dmyitriyevich Kondratieff (1892 - 
1938). Despite both his antiquity and the fact that he was essentially a Soviet 
economist (before he fell out of favour with Stalin and was sent to the Gulags) he has 
always been around in both the work of economists as different as Schumpeter and 
Mandel, but also, more interestingly for our purposes, in the world of long-term 
investment strategy analysts working in the markets today.  
 
Kondratieff’s basic thesis is that, in addition to the normal and well-documented 5 - 7 
year business cycles, there are clearly discernible 50-60 (actually, the average is 56) 
year long waves at work in the trade cycles of the world economy. These waves are 
essentially driven by the technological change and shift to credit finance made 
possible only by a capitalist organisation of society in which trade and the market take 
precedence. The anarchistic nature of the market means that surpluses and over-
accumulations or booms take place which then have to be shaken out of the system in 
the form of slumps. The state is obliged to play a role in regulating these 
discrepancies but it is not possible, he maintains, to obviate them entirely within the 
structures of the capitalist market. Of course pure free-marketeers would maintain that 
this is precisely what makes capitalism so ‘creatively destructive’ and dynamic and 
that the state should keep out of the business of business. However, what interests us 
here is the social and political consequences of boom and slump on this long-term 
scale for both the capitalist world and, in the 70s and 80s, for the Soviet Bloc. 
Kondratieff published his analysis in 1926 in his work ‘Die langen Wellen der 
Konjunktur’.3 Since then, of course, we have had almost a century of further 
statistical data to go on, most of which has pointed to a high-degree of cogency for the 
Long Wave theory. Based on his calculations, Kondratieff clearly predicted the Wall 
Street Crash of 1929 and the depression which would follow it but also the recovery 
which would follow after about a 20-year duration. If we look at the following graph 
we can see that, although many of the statistics have been aggregated, the basic trend 
in developments is convincing: 
                                                 
3 Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik Vol. 56/3, 1926, pp.573-609 
http://www.kwaves.com/kwave.pdf (accessed 02.10.08) 
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 Graph 1:
 
A more detailed analysis of these waves (follow ctrl+click) shows an interesting trend 
in the 1990s which led to a prolongation of the so-called autumnal boom beyond its 
duration during the pre-crash booms of 1864-1874 and 1921-1929, i.e. around 9 or 10 
years. This time the boom lasted from 1982 (after the deep primary recession of 1979) 
until around 2000, i.e. around 20 years, when commodity prices, interest rates, the 
Producer Price Index and the CRB Index all began to show a marked decline. This 
was the period of uninterrupted growth of which Gordon Brown somewhat 
disingenuously but entirely understandably boasted and the apparent ‘end of boom 
and bust’ which he rather stupidly proclaimed. Some boom, some bust. The boom was 
prolonged by private and public deficit spending, the bust exacerbated by the 
catastrophic collapse of the sustainability of that spending.  
 
The following graphs give some indication of the scale of the increase in private and 
national deficit spending in the US, particularly since 1974 and particularly in the 
domestic sector. Although these statistics relate to the US economy, the central and 
determining role of the US for the global economy is clear. The problems of Hypo 
Real Estate, for example, demonstrate that even Germany, the most cautious of 
European states when it comes to private lending, cannot escape the effects of the 
crash. Peer Steinbrück may have been right when he maintained that the Second Great 
Crash is an Anglo-Saxon crisis4 but the problem is that we are all Anglo-Saxons now:  
                                                 
4 Bundestag debate 25.09.2008  
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Graph 2:  
Graph 3:  
 
 
 
The past year has seen an acceleration of the relative decline since 2000 and the past 
month a slump.5 The question is whether the higher and longer than usual increase in 
wholesale prices indicated in figure 1 will lead to a larger and longer than usual slump 
in the same over the coming years. If the trend is as predicted and based on past 
                                                 
5 See Robin Blackburn, ‘The Subprime Crisis’ London: New Left Review 50, 2008, pp.63-108 for a 
detailed analysis of the background to this crisis. 
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experience and Kondtratieff data then we are looking at a winter slump which will last 
until at least 2015, if not longer, with 2020 a distinct possibility, before labour costs 
fall to a level which would allow for a return to profitability and, perhaps more 
importantly, levels of bad debt have finally been squeezed out of the system.  
 
If we stick with the comparison with the 1929 crash then we can see that the period of 
expansion which preceded it was accompanied and underpinned by a new 
technological boom with the increase of ‘Taylorised’ heavy industry and the 
automotive sector. This led to the massive expansion of an industrial working class 
which was already powerful as a result of the industrialisation and urbanisation 
processes of the late 19th century.  A boom, however, not only gives the industrial 
working class objective power through full employment but also tends to increase 
their level of political awareness and activity. They become not only an economic 
factor of production but also a political class in their own right. The democratic rights 
implicit in the liberal constitutions of the capitalist states were initially intended to 
apply to only very limited sectors of society (Jefferson’s infamous disdain for wage 
labour and workers is emblematic here) and their extension to women, blacks and 
non-property owners was as inevitable as it was resisted. In that sense the period after 
the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution saw the culmination of this pressure 
in the integration of the working class into a socio-political settlement which would 
eliminate the need for revolutionary change. We could therefore see 1918 as the start 
of the ‘Short Political Century’6. By this I mean that politics and political integration 
of the working class increasingly took primacy over the subordination of social 
questions to the purely economic exigencies of the market which had prevailed up 
until the end of the First World War. Philip Bobbit has argued, for example, that the 
three great political movements of the inter-war period; namely fascism, communism 
and parliamentary democracy, were actually just more or less desperate attempts to 
buck the market and to establish political control over, if not ownership of, the means 
of production.7
 
He also maintains, in my view correctly, that this political century came to an end in 
1974 and was replaced by the ‘market-state’ in which the amorphous powers of Wall 
Street and the needs of globalised free trade regulated the political sphere.  If we look 
at our Kontradtieff curves we see that this period coincides with the end of the long 
post-war boom when the increasing rates of employment brought about by the 1949 
upturn meant that profit rates and capital productivity were falling and inflation was 
rising, along with wages and commodity prices. In the West the strength of the 
organised working class was in decline and the new technologies and social change 
which the high levels of investment in the boom period had brought about were 
increasingly undermining its industrial uniformity. It should not be ignored, however, 
that in addition to this objective socio-economic transformation there was a 
determined political push in the 1970s to drive back the labour movement and re-
establish the rule of capital and with it the primacy of profitability. The accession to 
power of the monetarist group from Chile in 1974 to the UK in 1979 and the US in 
1980 marked the turn back to the Primacy of Economics in political decision making. 
Neo-liberalism marked the end of the ‘Short Political Century’ and the primary 
                                                 
6 Peter Thompson, Crisis of the German Left, London and New York: Berghahn, 2005 
7 Philip Bobbit, The Shield of Achilles, London, 2002. 
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recession of 1979-1982 brought about the necessary disciplinary shock for the 
working class in the West. 
 
Of course in the Soviet Bloc the situation was very different. There, since 1917 in the 
Soviet Union and since 1945 in Eastern Europe, the Primacy of the Political had held 
firm sway. Any attempts to introduce forms of Perestroika, from Lenin’s NEP 
onward, in which improved economic efficiency was sought using market 
mechanisms, had quickly led to uncontrollable political developments which 
threatened party control and therefore had to be stopped.8 This in-built, though 
paradoxical, element of workers’ power in the Soviet Bloc was the very thing which 
both stopped it developing economically but also kept alive a political tradition, in the 
form of a vaguely socialist ideology in both east and west, long after the actual 
conditions for the establishment of socialism had disappeared. That no one (apart 
from the dissidents!) believed that the Party actually represented a socialist path is 
neither here nor there. It was clear to everyone that the phrase ‘real-existing 
socialism’ actually meant ‘non-existent socialism’ but the appeal to a subjective 
Vorschein of a better world, to use Ernst Bloch’s description,  was something which 
resonated on both sides of the iron curtain despite the objective impossibility of 
achieving it at that point.  
 
The maintenance of this Schein as well as Vorschein of socialism was an expensive 
business however. The initial impressive growth rates which propelled the Soviet 
Union from a rural and backward economy into an industrial superpower soon 
deteriorated as the move towards new technologies in the West left the Soviet Bloc 
behind economically. The decision by the West to use the COCOM agreements and 
other boycotts to exclude the Soviet Bloc from technological and industrial renewal 
was secondary in importance to the Soviet Union’s socio-political need to carry on 
subsidising uneconomic and outdated production under the auspices of the Brezhnev 
Social Contract and Honecker’s ‘unity of economic and social policy’. The GDR’s 
honorary and hidden membership of the EC through its trading links with West 
Germany did nothing to obviate the crisis in the end. What this industrial policy 
represented, however, was no more than an intensive continuation of the socio-
industrial policies carried out in the whole of the world economy towards the end of 
the long boom, only ended by the Chicagoistas in 1974. The similarity between what 
the Soviet Bloc did in the 1970s and 80s by borrowing and subsidising in order to 
prolong the party (and the Party) with the prolonging of the autumnal boom of the 
capitalist world through deficit spending and financial deregulation since around 1982 
at once becomes clear. In effect there has been a leap-frogging of bankruptcy. The 
West decided to return to a policy of the roll-back of socialism in 1974 in which the 
financial weapon would play an important role in arming and indebting the Soviet 
Union to death. After the clear victory of capitalism over socialism in 1989, however, 
the system itself could only be maintained by arming and indebting itself to death.9
 
                                                 
8 The only successful application of Perestroika we have seen, largely because of the complete absence 
of any accompanying component of Glasnost a well as its success due to the coincidence with the long 
autumn boom in the West, is in China. 
9 Der Spiegel Online on 6th October calls the rescue of Hypo Real Estate a ‘beinahe-Pleite’, the term 
used in the GDR in 1982 to describe the potential bankruptcy of the state, which was avoided only by 
taking out more credits from West Germany 
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The Wende of 1989 as well as that of 2008 therefore have to be understood in this 
context as socio-economic necessities rather than as the results of purely voluntaristic 
activities by either the ‘Heroes of Leipzig’ in 1989 or ‘spivs and speculators’ today. 
The fact that in 1989 the working class in the GDR was hardly involved at all in 
oppositional activity until the very last weeks of the crisis and that those who led the 
opposition ended up being the only ones who actually believed in the dream of 
socialism and were consequently trounced at the March 1990 elections demonstrates 
this paradox quite clearly.  The problem is that rather than being simply a victory of 
capitalism over socialism, 1989 represented the final demise of the last hyper-
Keynesian states of the 1970s just at a point where the apparent victors in the West 
were themselves entering a new phase of autumnal crisis. Where Communism had 
held off its crisis of under-production and low labour productivity by brute and 
massive state spending, capitalism held off its own new crisis of overproduction 
through a much more refined and sustainable - though far greater - level of public and 
private leveraged financing.       
 
What this means is that for social democracy and the centre-left in general since 1989 
saw an adaptation to the ‘Washington Consensus’ to which there appeared to be no 
alternative and which, many on the Left started to believe, was actually the way 
forward for liberal and progressive forces. This is particularly clear in the political and 
economic directions taken by New Labour under Blair and Brown, but was also 
common to all the major European social democratic movements and parties 
throughout this period. The room for manoeuvre to the left of social democracy 
during this period was seriously limited and only really existed in a few countries in 
Western Europe for a limited period.10 The sole real exception to this was the case of 
the PDS/Linke and it is to this phenomenon of the apparent success of a party to the 
left of social democracy in the most heavily populated and industrialised country in 
Europe which I would like to turn. 
 
The prospects for the Left in Germany between 1989 and today were conditioned by a 
combination of objective and subjective factors which left them, paradoxically, in 
both a weak and a strong position simultaneously. First the negative: 
 
1. Capitalism emerged as economically and socially triumphant in an inter-systemic 
struggle which had dominated European and global politics for almost a century.  
 
2. The appeal of socialism, let alone Marxism, as a governmental system was 
destroyed. The PDS’s association with the SED, the constant description of it as ‘the 
successor party to the SED’ and ‘die Stasi-Partei’, limited its appeal to a relatively 
small section of the East German population and a tiny proportion of the western left 
 
3. Shifts in production towards the tertiary sector, although not as pronounced as 
elsewhere in Europe, had undermined the traditional heavy industrial base of the West 
German working class. The inefficiency and uncompetitive nature of East German 
meant that it all but disappeared within 2 years of reunification. This has led to both 
mass unemployment and a concomitant a weakening of the bargaining position of the 
unions and a fall in real wages. As Oliver Nachtwey and Tim Spier point out, after 
                                                 
10 See Tim Spier and Clemens Wirries ‘Ausnahmenerscheinung ode Normalität? Linksparteien in 
Westeuropa’ in Tim Spier et al. (eds) Die Linkspartei. Zeitgemäße Idee oder Bündnis ohne 
Zukunft?Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007, pp.71-116 
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rising to a high point of 77.1% in 1982, in the last year of an SPD-led government, the 
wage quota fell away to 70% under the CDU in 1997, rose slightly again under the 
new SPD government under Oskar Lafontaine as finance minister and then dropped 
away further to 67.3% in 2005, the lowest for nearly 40 years.11 This post-Lafontaine 
turn of the SPD to a measured neo-liberalism in the form of the Neue Mitte, Hartz IV 
and, towards the end of the SPD-Green government, Agenda 2010 programmes after 
1999 undermined support for the SPD amongst workers in both East and West. 
 
4. Since 1989, despite the relative strength of German industry, these changes have 
shifted the balance of class power in favour of the employer. Despite the complaints 
from the ‘Masters of Wall Street’, Germany has undergone considerable market 
reform. Over 20% of the workforce is in official low-wage jobs (the unofficial total is 
probably around 26%) and strikes are at an all time low in a country which already 
had notoriously tough strike laws. Labour unit costs have fallen faster than in the US 
or UK. Large sectors of the economy, above all telecommunications and energy, were 
privatised. Expenditure on pensions and health is below the EU average and costs for 
social spending in general have fallen in recent years, not risen. Taxes on capital are 
among the lowest in the EU and there has been an annual cut of 1% in jobs in the 
public sector over the past decade, with unemployment rising in Germany as a whole 
to around 9.9% by 2005 and in East Germany to 18.8%.12 As a result, the OECD, in 
its 2005 report, described Germany as a model reformer. The deficits which do exist 
are largely a result of the massive costs of reunification and have relatively little to do 
with structural weaknesses in the economy itself or with any property bubble, though 
the most recent problems with Hypo show that German banks are also exposed to the 
credit crisis. The costs and effects of unification also mean that the unemployment 
statistics themselves are distorted. If one takes West Germany alone then its 
unemployment rate is below the European average. The comparison with the UK 
which is always made is also erroneous as it has 2.7 million people on incapacity and 
other benefits. Nachtwey and Spier also demonstrate that support for the welfare state 
and social solidarity also fell in both East and West Germany between 1994 and 2004, 
although it remains at a relatively high level.13  
 
However, on the positive side: 
 
1. The ideological appeal of socialism and Marxism as potential systems of 
governance given the right conditions also remained strong. The widespread feeling, 
especially amongst ex-GDR citizens, that socialism was a good idea which had been 
badly carried out continued to apply.  In addition there had been 2.3 million members 
of the SED, almost 25% of the adult population (though most of these joined for 
careerist reasons, over 90% leaving the party for the same reason in 1989), and the 
Party had been much more firmly anchored in civil society than had been assumed by 
most western observers. This gave the PDS a political, organisational, financial and 
social base unrivalled elsewhere in Europe. 
 
                                                 
11 Oliver Nachtwey and Tim Spier, ‘Günstige Gelegenheit? Die sozialen und politischen 
Entstehungshintergründe der Linkspartei’ in: Tim Spier et al. (eds) Die Linkspartei. Zeitgemäße Idee 
oder Bündnis ohne Zukunft?Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007, pp.39-40. 
12 The method of calculating unemployed changed in the 1990s so that the self-employed are now 
counted in amongst the economically active employed sector. 
13 Ibid pp.33-34 
 9
 
2. The unification of Germany strengthened the demographic weight of the protestant, 
secular, working-class tradition of the East against the domination of the bourgeois 
and social-catholic traditions which prevailed in the southern and western areas of 
West Germany. This new demographic reality was what helped the SPD back into the 
lead role in government in 1998 and maintained them there until 2005. That they are 
now extremely weak in opinion polls, though still present in government of course, is 
largely to be explained by both a polarisation on the left between the SPD and Die 
Linke and a general weakening of the two large parties in favour of the smaller ones. 
Structurally, if one adds the support for SPD, PDS and Greens together, the left in 
general after the mid-1990s was and is in a relatively healthy state. Despite the 
relatively low population densities in the north and east this map of constituency votes 
in the 2005 Federal Election clearly demonstrates this: 
 
 
source: http://stat.tagesschau.de/wahlarchiv/wid246/index.shtml
 
3. The dominance of the SPD on the traditional centre-Left meant that the PDS was 
not able to move onto that ground, as ex-communist parties had in the rest of Eastern 
Europe. This forced it to maintain a leftist and oppositional stance on the major issues 
of the day. This meant that the PDS provided a Sammelbecken for general German 
left dissatisfaction with both the principle and consequences of unification as well as 
giving it an anti-capitalist focus. 
 
4. The PDS was also a means by which many in the ex-GDR could express their sense 
of regional identity and Heimat, becoming, in Toralf Staud’s words, an East German 
CSU.14 This regional base and organisational strength also meant that it could prove 
itself as a party of power as well as radical opposition.  
 
5. The formation of the WASG in spring 2004 by union activists, disaffected SPD 
members and leftist intellectuals formed a basis for the revival of the left in West 
                                                 
14 Toralf Staud ‘PDS. Auf dem Weg zur ostdeutschen CSU’ Die Zeit 43/2000, p.1. 
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Germany untainted by the negative associations with the GDR, which had always 
prevented a breakthrough for the PDS. 
 
6. The fusion of the PDS with the WASG to form the new Die Linke has, for the first 
time since the Weimar Republic, created a significant political force to the Left of the 
SPD which has roots not only in the educated public sector liberal middle class, as 
with the Greens in the early 1980s, but increasingly in the organised working class, 
the unemployed and intellectuals and pensioners (the latter particularly in the ex-
GDR). In terms of the longevity and survivability of Die Linke, there has been a 
significant shift in support. Again Nachtwey and Spier show that West German 
working class allegiance to the SPD has fallen from +0.9 (on a scale from +1 to -1) in 
1977 to +0.25 in 2005 with East German workers’ allegiance falling from a high of 
+0.25 in 1996 to -0.25 in 2005.15 In the same period working class sympathy for the 
PDS rose from -1 in 1991 to +0.5 in 2005. At elections, overall support for the 
PDS/Linke rose in the West from 0.3% in 1990 to 4.9% in 2005 and in the East it has 
gone from 11.1% to 25.3%. Amongst workers the shift is even more pronounced, with 
an eight-fold increase in the West from 1 – 8% and an almost six-fold in the East from 
5 – 28%.16 While the number of workers has fallen during that period, somewhat off-
setting these shifts, the number of unemployed has also risen dramatically and many 
more of this group are shifting their allegiances from the SPD to Die Linke. Amongst 
the unemployed in the West, support for the PDS/Linke improved from 2% in 1994 
(no data for 1990) to 14% in 2005 and in the East from 9% in 1990 to 42% in 2005. 
This trend has also dragged the SPD, at least in temperament if not yet in practical 
politics, to the left. 
 
All of these factors mean that at the 2005 election it was possible for Die Linke to 
achieve 8.7% of the vote largely on the basis of presenting itself as: 
a) The party of social justice 
b) The representative of East German interests in a united Germany.  
c) The continuation of the traditions of an all-German workers’ movement 
d) The representative of subaltern groups in all sectors of society 
 
Thus class and region have come together to present the German political scene with a 
new agenda, i.e. how to deal with the increasing number of cleavages present in 
German society as traditional ways of voting and thinking begin to break down even 
further. If we look at the trend over the post-war period we can see that the tendency 
towards monolithic integration of classes into mass centrist parties plus the liberals 
coincides almost precisely with the long Kontratieff spring and summer boom from 
1949-1974. This is particularly the case for the SPD, where a clear ‘Genosse Trend’ is 
observable through the 60s and 70s, peaks in 1972 and falls away again, rescued only 
by German reunification, the autumn boom and the injection of traditionally social-
democratic and protestant East German support. However, the SPD’s flirtation with 
neo-liberalism drove traditional as well as new supporters into the arms of other 
parties. According to Infratest-dimap the SPD lost 2 million votes to all the other 
parties and none. The greatest number – 1.3 million went to the Linke/PDS and 
620000 to the CDU. 400000 didn’t vote at all. The main reasons given for these shifts 
were unemployment and social justice. 50% of SPD voters thought that the latter was 
                                                 
15 ibid p.24 
16 ibid p.22 
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central to their concerns. Overall the SPD lost some 2.4 million votes between 2002 
and 2005, only a quarter of which went to the CDU/CSU or FDP. Measured against 
the 1998 election, the SPD lost around 4 million votes. 
 
 
Graph 4: 
 
The coalitions of interest which were held together in the long boom have 
increasingly broken down as a result of cultural, social and economic dislocation, 
leading to the emergence of greater cleavage and polarisation.  
What this all means is that the dread term ‘working class’ will come back on to the 
agenda as the support of that class becomes ever more necessary to hold together a 
working majority. Euphemisms such as ‘Prekariat’, coined by those who believed the 
line that the working class had gone away when it had simply changed the colour of 
its collar, will become surplus to requirements and the working class vote will be up 
for grabs. However, that vote will no longer vote monolithically in favour of an 
alternative party of the left either. It will also throw up more significant anti-free-
market sentiment on the hard Right, with a probable increase in regionalist, nationalist 
and racist sentiment anchored in an anti-capitalist rhetoric, with calls for statist 
solutions to market problem. We have seen this recently in Bavaria17 and Austria18 
and it is likely to spread as the crisis deepens.  
The hard Right had a relatively good election in 2005. The Republikaner obtained 
266,317 votes and therewith 0.6% of the vote, about the same as 2002. But the NPD 
were able to treble their vote from 212,232 in 2002 to 743,903 (1.6%) this time. This 
difference could, however, be explained by the absence this time of the Schill Party 
which managed to get over 400,000 votes in 2002. This means that over a million 
voters voted for the extreme right nationwide but this was spread very unevenly. As 
                                                 
17 where the CSU achieved only 49.3%, a drop of 9.3% at the 2005 federal election compared to 2002 
and 17.3% at the state election on 28.09.08 over 2003. All of these lost votes went to the smaller 
parties, including Die Linke, Freie Wähler, FDP and Greens. The SPD also lost ground, down 1% 
(sources: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/ http://www.landtagswahl2008.bayern.de/taba4990.html ) 
18 In Austria, Haider’s BZÖ obtained 11% and the FPÖ 18%. Source: 
http://www.wahlergebnisse.info/5010.php) 
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could be expected they did best in those areas with high unemployment. With the 
exception of Sachsen-Anhalt the NPD attained over 3% in all East German states. In 
Sachsen, where the NPD are also in the state diet, they got 4.9% and even overtook 
the Greens, who got 4.6%. They did better, however, in more rural areas than they did 
in the cities. In the Sächsischen Schweiz they got 7.1%, in Kamenz-Hoyerswerda 
6.5%, in Bautzen-Weißwasser 6.3% and in Annaberg 6.3. In some areas within these 
constituencies they got over 10%. This would seem to indicate that Die Linke picks up 
urban disaffected votes and the NPD rural disaffected votes. 
Catholic voters are also becoming younger and more secular in the west. The CSU 
was the real loser of the 2005 election with over 800,000 votes lost to varying parts of 
the political spectrum. This represents a large part of the CDU/CSU’s overall losses at 
the election. At the same time Union voters have become more polarised in class 
terms. On the one hand the proletarianisation of the middle-classes has strengthened 
the CDA within the movement and led it to be quite critical of neo-liberalism. The 
Chair of the CDA, Karl-Josef Laumann, demanded that the CDU must not forget its 
christian-social roots under pressure of the neo-liberal agenda. The fear that it had 
done so pushed some 290,000 CDU votes even as far as Die Linke. Franz Walter 
points out that at least 40% of CDU voters have always been at least as well-disposed 
to the welfare state as have SPD voters.19  So the richer the region, the more rural it is, 
the lower the unemployment so the larger is the proportion of the vote going to the 
CDU/CSU/FDP. The FDP did better in the more urban areas amongst higher earners 
and the self-employed and the CDU/CSU amongst older and more rural voters. The 
CDU/CSU captured 45% of the over 60 year old vote and only 31% of those under 
30. At the same time however, many young CDU/CSU voters have not only become 
more socially liberal but also more economically so. This latter group, however, quite 
clearly shifted towards the FDP in 2005, and are likely to continue doing so in future.  
In 2005 the CDU lost more than 1 million votes to the FDP, who clearly presented 
themselves as the true neo-liberal reformers. The CDU also lost over 640000 voters to 
the non-voting camp. 
The big winners, of course, were the Linke. They doubled their 2002 result, picking 
up an extra 2 million votes, and got 8.7%: 4.9% in the West and 25.3% in the East. In 
Thuringia (26.1), Saxon-Anhalt (26.6), Brandenburg (26.6) they became the second 
largest party and in Berlin they gained 16.4% (29.5% in east, 7.2% in west). Even in 
Saxony they were only just in third place with 22.8. In Berlin-Marzahn-Hellersdorf 
and Berlin Lichtenberg the Linkspartei became the largest party with 34.4% and 
35.5% respectively. But in the West too the party did relatively well with 4.9% 
overall and in Lafontaine’s backyard in the Saarland they achieved 18.5%. Almost 
25% of the unemployed voted for the Linke. This was also the case for the bottom 
quartile in both East and West. In Duisburg North the PDS got 8.1% and in 
Gelsenkirchen  and Bochum-Herne, with almost 20% unemployment they reached 
almost 8%. They also did well in Rheinland-Pfalz. 
In Kaiserslautern, home of the Opel engine factory and Pirmasens, which has 17% 
unemployment alongside the highest proportion of millionaires in Germany, they 
attained nearly 9%. In Bremen they obtained 8.3%, in Bremen-II-Bremerhaven, with 
almost 20% unemployment, the vote was as high as 8.6%. Interestingly, only 70,000 
                                                 
19 See Franz Walter Die ziellose Republik Cologne: Kiwi, 2006, p.162 
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East German voters went to non-voters, whereas in the West it was over 1 million. 
Turnout rose in every East German land and fell in every West German land (Berlin 
saw a slight fall but this was due to East West split).20 This shows that the Linke/PDS 
was the party which mobilised non-voters, picking up over 200,000 of these. First 
time voters went predominantly for the SPD with 39% going to that party. 36% of 
workers and 33% of the unemployed still voted for the SPD but they also lost most 
heavily here (down 7% and 8% respectively), to the benefit of the Die Linke. The 
proportion of foreigners did not seem to affect the outcome of the election to any 
degree. Social class played its traditional role amongst the migrant community with 
the majority of the 550,000 Turks and other foreigners entitled to vote going for the 
SPD and, increasingly, the Die Linke. 
So, even in electoral terms, the Linke is here to stay. This is perhaps one of its greatest 
achievements given that in 1990 the PDS was expected to disappear along with the 
GDR and that political scientists have been almost entirely hostile to both the PDS 
and Die Linke, apparently abandoning any semblance of academic neutrality when 
analysing its fortunes. More important than, though obviously linked to the electoral 
battle, however, is the extent to which the Linke, particularly in the Five New States, 
is perhaps more firmly anchored in the institutions and structures of civil society than 
any of the other main political parties which have degenerated into mere electoral 
machines. This is both a result of the positive legacy of its role as the state party in 
the GDR, a state which, as time moves on, is seen through increasingly rose-tinted 
spectacles as a failed but laudable alternative to capitalism21 as well as its position in 
the West as a party made up of union activists and disaffected Social Democrats and 
not merely a group of the usual leftist intellectuals.  
 
The Oskar Lafontaine factor also has to be taken into account: 
On the one hand, he remains a controversial party leader. The visceral hatred felt 
towards him by the leadership of the SPD will prevent any cooperation between that 
party and Die Linke just at a point where the Berührungsängste about the old PDS as 
the successor party to the SED are starting to fade.  
On the other hand his populist style and prominence as both a former Kanzlerkandidat 
and Finance Minister within the SPD have undoubtedly brought hundreds of 
thousands of voters to Die Linke in the West.  
 
All of this means that the German left in general22 and Die Linke specifically is 
actually in a potentially very healthy position. Being structurally embedded in society 
in the way it is puts it in a significantly better position to profit politically from the 
Second Great Crash. The mood over the next decade will be to re-establish the 
Primacy of Politics over the neo-liberal message of the Primacy of Economics. The 18 
years since unification saw a mood of neo-liberal hubris which allowed people such 
as Rupert Pennant Rea (former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England) to state that 
‘the penal taxation on which social liberalism was based was an import from Marxism 
                                                 
20 http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_7200_1.pdf p.23 
21 Whereas Nazism has never been able to escape the conclusion that it was an essentially ‘evil’ idea 
carried out well, socialism in the colours of the GDR is seen as an essentially good idea carried out 
badly. 
22 sooner or later there will be a Red-Green coalition with Linke support not only in Hesse but also at 
federal level 
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forced upon the rich by the Cold War’ and Roman Herzog (former President of 
Germany) that 
 
The systemic conflict of the twentieth century, unleashed by the Russian 
revolution in 1917, has come to an end. The antinomy under which we have all 
grown up and which split the world into two camps has been lifted. For the first 
time in history the idea of freedom has spread out and become almost 
unchallenged. And never before has there been such consensus that the free 
market is the economic system which best suits people’s energy and which can 
therefore guarantee their prosperity.’23
 
This now reads as almost as deluded as Honecker’s statement in 1989 that the ‘wall 
will still be here in fifty, a hundred years.’ The free market is no more a solution to 
the essential problems of a complex industrial society than were the Stalinist 
distortions and simplicities of the old SED and the opportunities for the German left 
to coalesce around this realisation over the coming decade are great. To paraphrase a 
US general on the destruction of the Vietnamese village Ben Tre, it may have been 
necessary to destroy socialism in order to save it, but 20 years after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall the world is shifting once again. 
                                                 
23 See Thompson Crisis of the German Left New York and London: Berghahn, 2005, p.69. 
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